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COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY HANDBOOK

FOREWORD

1. This handbook is designed to provide an abbreviated ready reference to pertinent available information concerning known Cuban Counterrevolutionary organizations. It represents an attempt to bring some degree of order out of the chaos which has resulted from the proliferation of such organizations; to indicate political orientation, organizational effectiveness, and fighting capability of each; and to list some of the personalities involved in each.

2. This handbook may conceivably be used also as a basis for an estimate, based on evidence accumulated up to 10 October 1962, of the capability of Cubans, both in exile and on the island, to contribute in an organized fashion to the liberation of their country. As summarized herein, such a capability apparently existed only in words among exiles, and not at all inside Cuba.

3. For purposes of presentation in this handbook, the (415) counter-revolutionary groups and movements have been divided into three categories: "Leading," "Secondary," and "Minor" organizations. Each category is treated separately in Parts I, II, and III respectively in this handbook. Part I describes the seven largest, most well-known, and most active groups. In addition to summaries contained in this handbook, detailed studies have been completed on two of these organizations (MRR and MRCN). Studies on two others (DRZ and UR) are in final stages, and the other three leading organizations will be similarly treated.

4. The remainder of the organizations have been arbitrarily divided into "Secondary" and "Minor," on the basis of judgment of the overall importance of individual organization. In some cases, information on which to make such a judgment is sketchy, and confusing; therefore, it is possible that some so called "Minor" organizations may emerge as groups superior to some "Secondary" organizations, and some "Secondary" organizations which now show promise may prove to be only shells. Part II, therefore, describes those organizations currently judged to be above average in importance. Part III describes those judged to be of little apparent value, paper organizations, or small disgruntled factions split from larger movements. As such, they have been treated in single brief statements.

5. It is apparent that since the Playa Giron invasion counter-revolutionary organizations, while increasing in number, have decreased in effectiveness until they can no longer be considered more than support mechanisms. In Cuba, CASTRO'S repressive forces have arrested and executed so many resistance leaders that these organizations have been compelled to constantly rebuild and reorganize. Penetrations are common place. It is suspected that some of the listed

counterrevolutionary organizations are in fact sponsored by Cuban intelligence services for the purpose of infiltrating "units", creating provocations, collecting bona fide resistance members into their ranks, and taking executive action against them. It is possible that the alleged "uprising" of August 1963, which resulted in the well-nigh final decimation of the resistance ranks, was the result of just such G-2 activities. Guerrilla and sabotage activities have been further reduced by lack of external support and scarcity of qualified leadership. In exile, leaders continue to hold meetings, to organize, to expound plans of liberation, and to criticize the United States' "do nothing policy." But it is the exceptional refugee leader who has the selflessness to relinquish status of leadership of his organization or himself by integrating into a single strong unified and effective body. "Unidades" and "Juntas" are continually being created to compete with one another for membership [and U.S. financial support]. They print impressive lists of member movements, which in many instances are only "pocket" or paper groups. Individuals appear in leadership roles in several or more movements simultaneously, indicating either a system of interlocking directorates or pure opportunism.

6. In order to place in perspective the hundreds of counter-revolutionary groups treated herein, it is necessary to understand the highly publicized CRC (Consejo Revolucionario Cubano - Cuban Revolutionary Council). The CRC is not included in the body of this handbook because it is not actually a counter-revolutionary group, but rather a superstructure which sits atop all the groups willing to follow its direction and guidance [in exchange for their portions of U.S. support for which the CRC is the principal channel.]

7. The CRC was originally known as the PRD (Presto Revolucionary Democratica) and was not officially called CRC or Consejo until the fall of 1961. The Consejo has always been beset with factionalism and internal dissension. It and its leader Dr. Jose MIRO Cardona have been continually criticized by Cuban exile leaders for a "do nothing" policy. The CRC does not participate in activities within Cuba but acts as a coordinating body for member organizations. It has delegations in each Latin American country as well as in France and Spain. Besides the main office located in Miami, it has offices in Washington, New York, and New Orleans. CRC gives financial support to member groups for salaries, administrative expenses and possible underground activities in Cuba. Current CRC membership includes: KDR, KRR, NDC, MTR, ARD, UND, plus individual members Antonio de VARONA Loreda, Antonio MACHO, Enrique HUERTAS, Sergio CARDO, Eginio DIAZ, and Ricardo LORIE. With the overt backing of the United States Government and MIRO'S personal contact with high government personalities, the CRC has maintained a certain amount of prestige, and has on occasion functioned effectively in the propaganda area. In 1962, it was largely responsible for the program to recruit exiled Cubans into the U.S. Army. Consejo officials have made speeches in support of United States policy and have published statements requesting unity of the exile community. Both MIRO and VARONA have travelled to Central America and Panama in attempts to gain support of those governments for the Cuban cause.

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Nevertheless, as an effective instrument for promoting Cuban liberation with positive action, the CRC as an organization has little to contribute in the military or resistance fields.

8. One other exile organization which will doubtless play an important role in any possible free Cuba is the CE (Corporaciones Economicas de Cuba). The CE is not listed in this handbook because it is not a counterrevolutionary group. However, because of its connection with the CRC and because of its potential as a lobby throughout the U.S. Government and business community, its influence cannot be overlooked. The CE is a federation of 30 Cuban business associations that formerly existed and functioned in Cuba (e.g. cigar, manufacturers, distillers, pharmacists, printers, etc.). Some member associations functioned in Cuba for over 50 years. The CE itself was in existence for over 25 years prior to reorganizing in exile. As an organization in exile it does not represent an active military force, but devotes its efforts toward providing information concerning communism and denouncing it to the People of the Americas. It advocates the reinstatement of the 1940 Constitution. The CE is aligned with the CRC because its members feel the Consejo is the most sound and representative unity mechanism. It provides economic advice to the CRC concerning economic measures that should be adopted when Cuba is liberated. Its president is Dr. Tilio DIAZ Rivera. Members of the Executive Committee are: Dr. German ALVAREZ Puentes, Jr.; Rafael GARCIA Bango; Dr. Francisco ESCOBAR Quesada; Dr. Leslie PAIVIE de Armas; George F. McDonald Stewart; Dr. Rodolfo HERRERA STAIN Rivera, and Dr. Antonio GIL Dominguez.

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COUNTER REVOLUTIONARY HANDBOOK
PART I: LEADING ORGANIZATIONS

I. IDENTIFYING DATA

A. Common Title or Abbreviation: MRR

B. Title: Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario
Movement for Revolutionary Recovery

C. Affiliation with Other Groups: Represented in original
PRD and present CRC.

D. Political Alignment and Basic Principles: Liberal but not left; supports free enterprise. Strong Catholic influence. Military flavor imparted by original nucleus of Rebel Army officers. Included Catholic students and government functionaries who early became disaffected with Castro Communism. Basic principles: To fight Communism and totalitarianism, return democracy, while maintaining those social reforms established in first six months of Castro regime. Factionalism was minimal until spring of 1962, when LASAGA became impatient with CRC inaction and led an unsuccessful revolt which resulted in his personal resignation from CRC.

E. Leading Personalities: In U.S.: Jose Ignacio LASAGA; Cesar BARO Esteva; Oscar SALAS Marrero (leader of faction more tolerant of Miro); Rafael QUINTERO Ibarria (military planner); Eginio aka Nino DIAZ (co-founder, once expelled, but taken back; reported in contact with KLN); Manuel BARO Esteva (to become Internal Military National Coordinator.) In Cuba: Beto MARQUEZ aka Rigoberto CASAS; Manuel ANTUNEZ Bozza (co-founder, Brigade leader; in prison), Juan FALCON aka Esteban (in prison; confessed on Cuban TV); Juan BUSTAMANTE aka Roley (believed G-2 penetration); Juan Manuel GUILLOT-Castellano (executed 29 Aug 1962 after last big round-up).

II. HISTORY

A. Date and Place of Origin: Mid-1959, Cuba.

B. Principal Activities to Date: Fighting activist group from inception. Was highly organized inside and well connected outside. Contributed men and leadership (ANTUNEZ himself) to 1961 invasion; Despite repeated rounds of arrests, until May 1962 maintained disciplined organization with demonstrated capability in propaganda, infiltration/exfiltration, limited guerrilla warfare, etc. Has usually worked well under U.S. sponsorship.

III. CURRENT STATUS

A. Estimated membership: Cuba 500 U.S. 500 ELSEWHERE 525.

B. Current Activities: At standstill inside, at least until return of Military Coordinator; estimated 5,000 members in prison. Exile maintaining wait-and-see attitude toward CRC; individual members joining U.S.-sponsored compartmented teams.

C. Support Facilities: Experienced crew and boat for infil/exfil; 20 trained action agents. Diplomatic courier, limited W/T. Finances from CRC, plus some private sources.

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